Redundancy Redo
How could all the redundant electrical generating systems on a Boeing 757 fail? That was the troubling question facing Continental Engineering after Flight 120 from Anchorage to Seattle was forced to operate on ship�s battery for nine minutes and divert to Ketchikan for an emergency landing Aug. 12, 2000.
The answer to that question is of concern not only to Continental pilots but to company executives as well because it could have ETOPS implications because of the severity of the incident.
It was an unprecedented emergency. A B-757 had never lost all electrical generating systems and been forced to revert to ship�s battery. And the event happened in the middle of the night along the rugged coastline of western Alaska, a severe test for Capt. Jim Humphreys and F/O Susan Shaw.
�The incident was the result of a combination of unique failures that had the potential of resulting in an accident,� said Toby Carroll, Continental Director of Safety Investigations. �The crew�s handling of the emergency reflects very positively on them and the training that they received.�
Even though Humphreys and Shaw had never before landed at Ketchikan, they were able to pilot Flight 120 to a safe landing at the airport, which is located on an island surrounded by mountainous terrain.
Carroll said Continental Engineering launched an immediate investigation.
�It was taken very seriously by everybody,� he said. �Engineering was all over this one. They very readily saw the seriousness of what happened and knew that immediate actions had to be taken to ensure safety.�
Here�s what�s known today:
Flight 120 was dispatched from Anchorage at 2:08 a.m. with the right Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) placarded for an input bearing failure. The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) substituted for the inoperative generator and powered the right side of the B-757.
At 3:35 a.m., the left IDG failed. Flight 120 was cruising at 37,000 feet approximately 100 nautical miles south-southwest of Ketchikan. Engineering believes this was caused by a mechanical failure in the generator field windings.
The APU, forced to power the entire plane, overheated 20 minutes later and automatically shutdown. Engineering determined this was the result of high oil temperatures exacerbated by a partially clogged oil cooling filter.
The Hydraulic Motor Generator (HMG) did not assume the electrical load as it is designed to do if the main aircraft bus is unpowered. Engineering could not pinpoint the cause of the HMG failure but believes it probably was caused by an intermittent hydraulic shut-off valve that did not open so that hydraulic fluid could flow to the HMG.
The ship�s battery is certified to supply electricity for 30 minutes and Flight 120 was approximately 30 minutes from Ketchikan, assuming the crew could find it in the dark with only basic navigational instruments and the four standby instruments.
So Humphreys attempted to restart the APU at 17,000 feet and it resumed generating electricity nine minutes after it automatically shutdown. Engineering believes the increased airspeed during the descent from 37,000 feet cooled the oil to the point where the auto shutdown command was removed.
The APU restored power to the aircraft and Humphreys and Shaw landed safely at 4:25 a.m. after turning on the pilot-controlled lights at the uncontrolled, unmanned Ketchikan airport.
�This certainly tested their airmanship skills,� said Carroll.
And it galvanized Continental Engineering into action.
�We�ve got some good engineers and they sensed the urgency of this,� Carroll said. �This thing was a very high priority.�
The department initiated a three-phase investigation. Phase I was designed to ensure aircraft fleet safety. Phase II was designed to determine the root causes of the incident. Phase III was designed to analyze the failures and implement corrective and/or preventive actions.
In Phase I, the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) on domestic flights was revised to require the HMG to be checked for proper operation whenever an IDG is inoperative. For ETOPS, HMG verification is required before every flight. Engineering also performed a full functional check of HMGs on all 41 of the B-757s in the Continental fleet. Four of the HMGs failed and were replaced.
The IDGs, APU and HMG from Flight 120 underwent functional testing and were torn down for inspection. HMGs from three other B-757s also were removed and dismantled for examination. The HMG inspections focused on a hydraulic shut-off valve manufactured by Circle Seal.
As part of the investigation, Engineering ordered repetitive inspection of the event aircraft�s HMG every 10 to 14 days for six months. No malfunctions were observed during this time. The FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring inspection of Circle Seal hydraulic shut-off valves every six months and replacement with Whittaker or redesigned Circle Seal valves in all flight critical applications.
Continental is in the process of modifying the Circle Seal valves on all its B-757s. There are 16 such valves on each aircraft.
As for APUs, Engineering sought to improve inspection procedures for APU oil coolers. Engineering also issued a Maintenance and Engineering Bulletin detailing proper trouble shooting procedures when an APU automatically shuts down.
Taken together, these actions should ensure the reliability of Continental B-757 electrical generating systems, said Carroll.
�We changed our procedures,� he said, �so that this will never happen again.�